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Numerous studies have sought to capture the economic eﬀect of the Greek debt crisis on the
country, but how has the crisis aﬀected the balance of power between central and regional/local
authorities in Greece? Eleftherios Antonopoulos writes that the reaction to the crisis has
signiﬁcantly weakened local and regional levels of government. He also notes that the fact that
Syriza and the Independent Greeks are not strongly represented at the level of local and regional
politics ensures this is unlikely to change under the current ruling coalition.
The Greek government’s attempts to renegotiate the terms of the country’s loan arrangements have
rekindled media and academic interest in the country. However, the emphasis on intergovernmental deliberations
and the technocratic aspects of macro-economic policies has obscured the challenges of implementation as a major
aspect of ﬁscal policy-making. This is acquiring increasing importance for shaping policy outcomes under conditions
of austerity.
Paradoxically, Greece’s implementation record has largely evaded the attention of both the Greek government and
its Eurozone partners. In fact, Greece’s austerity measures have tilted the balance of power in favour of the central
government and associated vested interests, while regional and local governance structures and services have
been unequally aﬀected. Issues of spatial equity and democratic participation have thereby been exacerbated.
The decline of subnational governance in Greece
Contrary to international perceptions, the actions of Greece’s new ruling coalition already demonstrate continuity
with the past. Ever since Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981, a change of party in government has signalled
attempts to achieve derogations from previous agreements or a renegotiation of terms. The new Greek
government’s positions are not an exception to this rule of thumb.
A 1982 memorandum by the Greek authorities claimed that diﬀerences in levels of development between Greece
and the EEC constituted an unequal partnership which required special treatment in order to be remedied. In 2004 a
new conservative government cast doubts over the integrity of oﬃcial data supplied to the Commission, even those
used to determine Greece’s EMU accession. The Papandreou government that followed discovered a hidden ﬁscal
deﬁcit of 15.4 per cent of GDP and an accumulation of 57 billion euros of national debt in 2007-2009.
Austerity may have further spelled a decline in state ﬁscal capacity as stressed in the academic literature, but that is
even more so for sub-national governance institutions in Greece. Streeck and Elsäser’s typology, which considers
peripheral Eurozone countries as displaying preferences for consumption-driven and nationally controlled ﬁnancial
transfers, can be corroborated with the Greek case.
Namely a recurring pattern in Greek central government policy has been to safeguard its role as a gatekeeper of EU
budgetary transfers and stress regional or social income disparities before EU institutions in order to be granted
higher discretion in national budget execution. With regard to Greece’s regional and urban policy, a sequence of
post-EEC accession governments have been preaching devolution but using EU mandated austerity to practice
centralisation.
The overarching domestic development goal in Greece has been national convergence, which has also been
reﬂected in EU structural and regional policy. In that sense EU structural funds have been persistently used as a
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substitute for missing regional development policies.
Early implementation set the trend for the future
thanks to the already low levels of public investment
at the time of the ﬁrst veriﬁcations of the additionality
principle in the late 1980s and lenience by
Commission services that did not move beyond
raising concerns. In the run-up to Greece’s aﬃrmative
vote for the Maastricht Treaty the country has been
promised –and delivered – a doubling of structural
funds resources. Further centralisation was signalled
by the creation of the Cohesion Fund in 1994, which
is managed on a national territory basis.
Over the last two decades, the process of
administrative and ﬁscal decentralisation produced
mixed results and backsliding has occurred since the
onset of the recession. In this respect both the 1997
Kapodistrias and the 2011 Kallikratis administrative
reform plans which were pursued in Greece have
been largely concerned with a reform or merger of structures, ceding responsibilities rather than providing a ﬁnancial
arm to the regional and local governments and oﬀering a sustainable revenue base.
Following Greece’s entry into a rescue programme in 2011, regions and municipalities have been subjected to
discretionary reductions in transfers and tight expenditure reduction targets, although sub-national government debt
accounts for merely 1 per cent of the total public debt. Thus an already weak regional and local capacity for public
services delivery has been further weakened by the national government’s channelling of the ﬁscal adjustment eﬀort
at the expense of subnational ﬁnances.
Both the new Greek government’s pre-election agenda and post-election policy priorities constitute an escalation of
policy choices pursued by previous governments. Thus, a frontloaded implementation of the Partnership Agreement
(PA) for the implementation of the EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) programmes for 2014-2020 in
Greece is planned. Furthermore the government so far maintains plans for central management of a large part of
those resources in the Ministry of Economy.
No commitments have been undertaken towards conferring management responsibilities to municipalities for
territorial investments of sustainable urban development type and community-led local development initiatives.
Greece’s authorities are uneasy with regard to thematic concentration and conditionalities in the 2014-20 period and
the ex ante requirement for a smart specialisation strategy in Greek regions is an additional concern.
The government’s emphasis on regaining sovereignty and alleviating social hardship through short-term transfers is
therefore in line with the policies pursued in the past three decades. Government pledges already point towards
addressing social exclusion and material deprivation for the segment of the population worst aﬀected by the crisis
through a further centralisation of EU resources, rather than on the basis of a long-term plan to boost regional
growth, jobs and competitiveness. National decision makers also stress the importance of EU ﬁnancial instruments
such as the PA and the Juncker package for a return to growth as the only potential sources of a development policy
in Greece. However maximisation of ﬁscal transfers and emphasis on absorption may only work at best as a quick
demand-side ﬁx.
The negative scenario is that given Greece’s ﬁnancial situation and lack of competitive economic basis the
authorities still have a perverse incentive to focus on maximising short-term absorption. Results orientation and sub-
national capacity building could break the cycle of aid dependence from EU ﬁnancial transfers, as was the case with
2/3
other past net beneﬁciaries of the EU budget (for instance Ireland).
The ruling coalition parties also lack strong inﬂuence and representation at the regional and local level, which can be
another disincentive for ﬁscal decentralisation. In a nutshell, centralised policy-making in Greece keeps producing
adverse outcomes for regional development which severely antagonise the sustainability and legitimacy of sub-
national forms of spatial governance.
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